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The world is  changing,  and strategic priorities  are changing;  and changing quickly.
Europe lives up an unprecedented security crisis since the cold war, with numerous
threats and challenges*.
The main threats faced by the Alliance in the European neighborhoods are often divided
between a Southern Front – today includes terrorism, migration and refugee flows, and
failed states in the Mediterranean; and an Eastern Front – hybrid threat posed by an
increasingly assertive Russia.
This simplified geographical has lead to regional fragmentation within the transatlantic
partnership, since 2014.
Reconciling the two perspectives was one of the objectives of the Warsaw summit, with
the idea that transatlantic solidarity could be at risk if an agreement on a balanced
response to the two flanks was not reached.
Rather than opposing the two “fronts”, the “transatlantic narrative should highlight the
constant linkage between the different threats” (Scheffer, et. al. 2017).
NATO’s involvement in the South does not need to mirror its engagement in the Eastern
Fronts, but rather be adjusted to the specificities of the crises. NATO has indeed shown
its ability regarding terrorism as well as its commitment to reassurance measures in
Eastern Europe.
All 29 allies are necessary to face both Eastern and Southern issues. States need to
protect both territorial integrity and the social, political, and technical fabric of their
societies. So, NATO states must determine how they can deter hostile state and non-state
actors from destabilizing Europe through military and non-military means.
But for these challenges, against these enemies, traditional deterrence hardly works. We
need  conventional  and  nuclear  deterence  to  assure  credibility,  and  also  civilian
Revista Militar N.º 2590 - Novembro de 2017 , pp 931 - 936.
:: Neste pdf - página 2 de 6 ::
deterence. We also know that deterrence alone is unlikely to assure lasting peace and
stability  (Major,  Molling,  2016);  it  requires  the  complement  of  the  right  vehicle  to
establish a  productive dialogue,  either with Russia  or  even non-state actors,  as  the
Alliance cannot afford to not talk with them.
It  is  in  the  interest  of  all  transatlantic  partners  to  reinforce  the  security  of  their
neighbors, and not only focus on the security of the transatlantic territory. So, for us, the
current discussions should focus on the level of ambition of NATO’s strategic adaptation,
as well as on the division of labor among transatlantic partners, including EU (Scheffer
et. al., 2017).
As we face a more uncertain world, close partnership between NATO and the EU is
essential. NATO and the EU will need to work more closely together and in the same
places, to make any new intervention strategy effective. In June 2016, both organizations
signed a Joint Declaration “to give new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU
strategic partnership” (EU, 2016) and, in December, the Council of the European Union
and Foreign Ministers of NATO adopted in parallel a common set of proposals (42, for
implementation in seven areas) for EU-NATO cooperation.
The new US administration assertiveness policy serves as a wakeup call for the Alliance.
Many NATO members have relied for far too long on US might, without living up to their
own financial obligations to the military alliance (NATO, 2017).
Former  US  Secretary  of  Defense,  Robert  Gates  speech  on  June  2011,  lambasted
European defense efforts. The arguments of Gates’s speech illustrated a renewed US
pressure and remained a reference for many US and European decision makers and
thinkers:
“In the past, I’ve worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance: Between
members who specialize in “soft’ humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking
tasks, and those conducting the “hard” combat missions. Between those willing and able
to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the
benefits of NATO membership – be they security guarantees or headquarters billets – but
don’t want to share the risks and the costs. This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are
there today. And it is unacceptable.
Part of this predicament stems from a lack of will, much of it from a lack of resources in
an era of austerity. For all but a handful of allies, defense budgets – in absolute terms, as
a share of economic output – have been chronically starved for adequate funding for a
long time, with the shortfalls compounding on themselves each year (...) The result is that
investment accounts for future modernization and other capabilities (…) I am the latest in
a string of U.S. defense secretaries who have urged allies privately and publicly, often
with  exasperation,  to  meet  agreed-upon  NATO  benchmarks  for  defense  spending.
However, fiscal, political and demographic realities make this unlikely to happen anytime
soon, as even military stalwarts like the U.K have been forced to ratchet back with major
cuts to force structure. Today, just five of 28 allies – the U.S., U.K., France, Greece, along
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with Albania – exceed the agreed 2% of GDP spending on defense (...) The benefits of a
Europe whole,  prosperous  and free  after  being  twice  devastated  by  wars  requiring
American intervention was self evident. Thus, for most of the Cold War U.S. governments
could justify defense investments and costly forward bases that made up roughly 50
percent of all NATO military spending. But some two decades after the collapse of the
Berlin Wall, the U.S. share of NATO defense spending has now risen to more than 75
percent – at a time when politically painful budget and benefit cuts are being considered
at home.
The blunt  reality  is  that  there  will  be  dwindling appetite  and patience in  the  U.S.
Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to expend increasingly precious
funds  on  behalf  of  nations  that  are  apparently  unwilling  to  devote  the  necessary
resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own
defense. Nations apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the
growing security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets.
Indeed, if current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted
and reversed, Future U.S. political leaders – those for whom the Cold War was not the
formative experience that it was for me – may not consider the return on America’s
investment in NATO worth the cost.”
The US political  establishment’s  perspective  has  changed significantly  over  the  last
years, as Europe, which was always considered strategically crucial, has shifted from
being the most stable region in the world to a center of security concerns (Scheffer at al,
2016).
Now, US expect a different burden share, and Europe should take responsibilities for
their own regional security. European allies have taken steps to increase their strategic
responsibility within the transatlantic partnership. But it remains unclear what level of
engagement and responsibility is sufficient to create a more secure Europe.
In both NATO summits, Wales and Warsaw, the 2 % DIP (Defense Investment Pledge)
was reaffirmed (NATO, 2016). Yet, even now, some European allies question the need for
a stronger defense commitment, based only on a pledge of 2%.
The mere increase of defense capabilities does not reflect the real European contribution
to the transatlantic partnership (Scheffer et. al.,  2016). Some point instead, to other
foreign policy instruments employed by EU member states, to reinforce the security of
their  neighbors,  like  economic  development  aid  that  must  increasingly  become  an
integral part of security policy (Dempsey, 2017).
Noble and efficient as these tools may be, they serve a different purpose. The war on
Europe’s Eastern doorstep and the instability in the Mediterranean are clear proof of
civilian power limits (Dempsey, 2017).
There is a very practical side to the defense spending disparity between US and Europe.
It  is  becoming increasingly  difficult  for  US forces  to  work with  other  NATO forces
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because of an emerging technology gap and the related interoperability. At some point in
the future European NATO forces may not be able to work alongside with the US military
forces (Oliver; Williams, 2016).
If Europeans met the DIP commitment by 2024, as agreed in Wales, “it would mean an
extra  $100 billion  annually  on  defense  spending”  (Dempsey,  2017).  Germany would
virtually double its military budget, spending more than Russia (Lorne; Angela, 2017).
We believe that the new European Defense Fund (5,5 billion euros per year) will help to
develop new military capabilities, improve cooperation and reduce duplication. This will
be a huge step to minimize the growing military asymmetry across the Atlantic (EU,
2017).
The current US administration strategic ambiguity, “for the bad reasons” have “achieved
in a few months what previous administrations have not succeeded to do in years: getting
Europeans to focus on defense spending and investment” (Dempsey, 2017), creating also
an opportunity to Europe builds a truly credible CSDP.
Now European  allies  need  to  develop  a  strategic  construct  for  burden  sharing  by
convincing publics that increasing defense spending is in their interest. For that, both the
EU and NATO need to think strategically – beyond election cycles (Dempsey, 2016).
Angela Merkel already started to follow this path. As we can verify on her declarations
after the last G7 meeting:
“I have experienced this in the last few days (...) And that is why I can only say that we
Europeans must really take our fate into our own hands – of course in friendship with the
United  States  of  America,  in  friendship  with  Great  Britain  and  as  good  neighbors
wherever that is possible also with other countries, even with Russia (...) But we have to
know that  we must  fight  for  our  future on our  own,  for  our  destiny  as  European”
(Reuters, 2017).
Reviewing the transatlantic relationship that has delivered a degree of stability for seven
decades demands political courage. A first step should be to seize the momentum and set
out a redefinition of  European security that takes into account that US will  remain
indispensable for the future of NATO (Merit, 2017).
The current US policy is shifted away from maters European. US is pivoting to Asia,
China is a potential peer competitor. US policy makers are increasingly focusing their
energy on Asia and commitments to allies such as Japan and South Korea, rather than
Europe. If a major crisis occurs, US will focus on the region, and when that happens,
interest in Europe will diminish significantly, reducing their presence in the continent.
To keep US as a strategic partner and engaged in the old continent and in order to
guarantee the cohesion of the transatlantic bond, transatlantic partners need to share a
common understanding of the changing and complex security environment and remind
that the challenges in the transatlantic relations are also about values, culture and very
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much connected to economic questions (Nagy, 2016).
In current security environment, if Europe wants to deal with the myriad of challenges in
its neighborhood, will have to step up its defense capabilities in the future. Neither NATO
nor EU had the full  range of tools to address these security challenges on its own;
cooperation between the two organizations is essential.
Despite its conceptual flaws, we believe that the 2 % metric will remain the tool of choice
in the debate over military spending in NATO. A smarter yardstick would produce a more
sophisticated picture of reality but would not have the same political impact. (Techau,
2015)
For  us,  the  real  debate  should  focus  less  on  spending  and  more  on  the  widening
transatlantic divide over security in Europe. Although we face a global strategic shifts,
NATO  must  continue  to  be  the  guarantor  of  Europe´s  collective  defense  and  the
transatlantic bond must remains the bedrock of European security.
For  now,  NATO remains  a  community  based on  shared values,  including individual
liberty,  human rights,  democracy  and  the  rule  of  law,  and  his  essential  mission  is
unchanged. This is the main reason why a number of countries still aspire to join the
Alliance, and why NATO remains strong, and as necessary today as ever.
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